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Haute-Garonne Department and the SNCF
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JEAN-CHRISTOPHE TRUILHÉ, GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONER†
May 16, 2006 Hearing
June 6, 2006 Reading
_______________________

The October 4, 1940 ―law‖1 on ―foreign nationals of the Jewish
race,‖ was applicable until the August 9, 1944 executive order,
concerning the restoration of republican legality on the French
Translator‘s note: the SNCF, an acronym for ―Société nationale des chemins
de fer,‖ is the French National Railway Company.
† For an explanation of the now-extinct position of Government Commissioner
or commissaire du gouvernement, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Recent French
Legal Developments Concerning a War-Time Arrest and Imprisonment Case, 25
MD. J. INT‘L L. 264, 265 n.3 (2010).
1. Translator‘s note: the expression, acte dit loi, was used in the original French
document to refer to laws enacted during the Vichy régime but which were later
rendered void by the August 9, 1944 Order restoring republican legality. (VGC).
The French expression connotes a governmental action that pretends to be law
without in fact being so and has been used by others to express the idea that
Vichy‘s so-called laws were not law. See, e.g., DOMINIQUE REMY, LES LOIS DE
VICHY: ACTES DITS ―LOIS‖ DE L‘AUTORITE DE FAIT SE PRETENDANT
«GOUVERNEMENT DE L‘ÉTAT FRANÇAIS» (1992).
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mainland, went into effect. Article 1 of the October 4, 1940 ―law‖
provided that ―foreign nationals of the Jewish race may, from the date
of the currently promulgated law, be interned in special camps by
decision of the prefect of the ―département‖2 in which they reside.‖
The implementation of these provisions was to be combined, in
particular, with those provisions found in the July 22, 1940 ―law‖
regarding the review of naturalizations (those which had occurred
pursuant to the law of August 10, 1927)3 as well as the October 3,
1940 and June 2, 1941 ―laws‖ on the status of Jews.4
The August 9, 1944 order of the Provisional Government of the
French Republic regarding the restoration of republican legality on
the mainland, after providing in Article 1 that ―the Republic . . . by
law . . . did not cease to exist‖ provides in Article 2 that ―all
legislative acts . . . and the orders issued in implementation thereof on
the continental territory after June 16, 1940, and until the
establishment of the Provisional Government of the French Republic
[in 1944] are null and void and of no effect,‖ but ―this nullity must be
expressly specified.‖5 The order further provides in Article 3 that ―the
following acts are hereby declared to be null and void: . . . all those
laws establishing any discrimination whatsoever on the basis of an
individual‘s status as a Jew . . . .‖
In this case, Mr. Georges Lipietz, age twenty-one at the time, his
half-brother, Mr. Guidéon S., age fifteen at the time, their mother,
Mrs. Stéphanie O.-H., Mrs. S., age fifty at the time, and her second
husband, father of Mr. Guidéon S., Mr. Jacques S., age forty-two,
were arrested by the Gestapo on the morning of May 8, 1944 at Pau
on the basis of their real or assumed Jewish origins. It is important to
note that Mr. and Mrs. S., of Polish origin, had acquired French
citizenship prior to the July 22, 1940 ―law,‖ on the basis of the
2. A département is a territorial and administrative division. (VGC).
3. This law had facilitated the naturalization process. See Rémi Rouquette, The
French Administrative Court’s Rulings on Compensation Claims Brought by
Jewish Survivors of World War II, 25 MD. J. INT‘L. L. 304, 307 n.5 (2010). (VGC).
4. Both of these laws defined who was to be deemed a Jew and limited the
professions which Jews were entitled to exercise. The second of these laws, harsher
than the first, replaced the first. For the text of the laws and commentary on them,
see REMY, supra note 1, at 87–91, 116–27. (VGC).
5. It had to be expressly specified in post-war legislation nullifying exactly
which statutes and regulations of Vichy were to be revoked because the Vichy
regime had carried on normal governmental functions and enacted innumerable
laws and regulations that did not need to be revoked. (VGC).
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August 10, 1927 law.6
On the afternoon of May 8, 1944, under the supervision of German
soldiers, the parties were transferred to Toulouse where they then
were turned over to the Haute-Garonne administration.
Mr. Lipietz and the S. family members then were subjected to
administrative detainment in the premises of the penal administration
until the morning of May 10, 1944 on the decision of the services of
the Haute-Garonne administration and based on the aforementioned
provisions of Article 1 of the ― law‖ of October 4, 1940.
On the morning of May 10, 1944, again on the decision of the
services of the Haute-Garonne administrative services, they were
turned over to the SNCF with the goal of transporting them to the
Paris-Austerlitz train station. Their transportation from the HauteGaronne to Paris-Austerlitz took place via cattle car, which was
ventilated by a single opening and contained fifty-two people. The
journey, which did not end until the evening of May 11, 1944, lasted
more than thirty hours, during which time they received water only
once, at the Red Cross‘s initiative at the Limoges train station.
On the evening of May 11, 1944, the Societé de Transport en
Commun de la Région Parisienne (STCRP)7 transported them in
buses from the Paris-Austerlitz train station to the Drancy internment
camp.
From May 11, 1944 to the evening of August 17, 1944, Mr. Lipietz
and the S. family were interned at the Drancy camp, which was run
by the German Occupation authorities yet guarded by French police.
There, they were classified as ―deportable persons.‖ However, the
advancement of the allied troops towards the Parisian region
ultimately saved them from deportation. Nonetheless, on August 17,
1944, after the Germans had departed, the French guards continued to
enforce the internment measures until the Swedish Consul, Raoul
Nordling, intervened that same day, leading to the camp‘s liberation.
*
Through two prior claims to the Administration of the HauteGaronne and the regional director of the SNCF Midi-Pyrénées
respectively on September 6, 2001, Mr. Georges Lipietz and Mr.
6. See supra note 5. (VGC).
7. Translator‘s note: the STCRP is the Parisian Regional Transit Company.
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Guidéon S. sought joint and several liability from the State and from
the SNCF for alleged wrongful acts committed by the services of the
Haute-Garonne administration and the railway company.
Mr. Lipietz sought damages for the emotional harm and difficulties
to which he and his mother were subjected—in the amount of €
100,000 for himself and € 50,000 for the successors in interest of his
mother, sharing the damages with his brother, Mr. Guidéon S., for a
total compensation of € 150,000.
Mr. S. sought damages for emotional harm and difficulties to
which he and his parents were subjected—in the amount of € 100,000
for himself, € 100,000 for the successors in interest of his father, and
€ 50,000 for the successors in interest of his mother, sharing the
damages with his brother, Mr. Georges Lipietz, for a total
compensation of € 250,000.
Both prior compensation requests were rejected implicitly by the
Services of the Haute-Garonne and expressly by the legal director of
the SNCF on October 5, 2001.
In their complaint filed on November 14, 2001, Mr. Lipietz and
Mr. S. request this Court to grant judgment jointly and severally
against the State and the SNCF and order them to pay € 150,000 and
€ 250,000 respectively for the aforementioned damages.
The successors of Mr. Georges Lipietz, who passed away in the
course of the proceedings, are as follows: his widow, Mrs. Colette
Lipietz, and his children, Mr. Alain Lipietz, Mrs. Catherine LipietzOtt, and Mrs. Hélène Lipietz.
In the latest of their submissions, Messrs. Guidéon S. and the
Lipietz parties also request that this Court add the interest that has
accrued to the damages requested since the date of receipt of the two
prior claims on September 6, 2001 and that such interest be
capitalized annually.
In a memorandum of law filed on May 8, 2006, the plaintiffs also
ask this Court: first, to void the two decisions dated April 24, 2006,
by which the Secretary of Defense invoked the four-year statute of
limitations against Mr. Georges Lipietz and Mr. Guidéon S., and
second, to find the government liable to pay to each of Mr. George
Lipietz‘s successors in interest the sum of € 1 in redress for the moral
wrongs they suffered due to their deceased spouse and father‘s
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having received notice of the unfavorable decision against him.
Finally, the petitioners further request that this Court require the
State and the SNCF to jointly pay € 6,000 to Mr. Guidéon S. and €
1,500 to each of the Lipietz petitioners, pursuant to Article L. 761-1
of the CJA.8
*
The administrator of the Haute-Garonne and the SNCF request that
the claims be dismissed.
Concerning the government‘s defense in this case, it should be
emphasized that, under the provisions of Article R. 431-10 of the
CJA, the defense lies solely with the administrator of the HauteGaronne, since it is undisputed that the litigation ―arose from the
government‘s civil administration activities in the aforementioned
département.‖9 The Secretary of Defense would be unable effectively
to invoke the provisions of Article R. 431-9 of the same Code to
demonstrate his status as ―relevant minister‖ within the meaning of
that article, since Article R. 431-9 of the CJA is only relevant
―subject to the provisions of Article R. 431-10‖ of the same Code. As
for the decision resulting from the October 23, 2003 inter-ministerial
meeting—the summary of which was provided to you by the Minister
of Internal Affairs and Planning10—declaring that the government
would be represented and defended by the Secretary of Defense in
the event of any claims for damages based on the enforcement of
anti-Semitic legislation by the government of the so-called French
State,11 this decision is devoid of any normative character.
Following a formal notice to present his defense, addresses on
March 13, 2006 by the president of the Second Chamber of this Court
and pursuant to Article R. 612-3 of the CJA, the administrator of the
Haute-Garonne nevertheless produced a seven-line memorandum on
March 28, 2006, by which he incorporated, as an alternative, the
submissions of the Secretary of Defense.
8. Translator‘s note: CJA means the Code of Administrative Justice.
9. See supra note 2. (VGC).
10. Translator‘s note: Ministre de l’intérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire.
11. The reference here to the ―French State‖ is to the ‗Etat français, the name
Vichy gave itself to distinguish itself from the Républiques françaises, the
republican form of government that had been France‘s form of government since
the time of the French Revolution except for its short spurts of empire and renewal
of Bourbon monarchy. (VGC).
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*
In light of the extreme gravity of the events, the advisory opinion
that we shall present is based on references to case law that may seem
abstract to the victims of the events in question and to their family
members who have not been formally trained in public law; we
apologize in advance to the parties involved.
In another sense, we are forced to apply legal reasoning devoid of
any complacency regarding the past actions of the Haute-Garonne
administrator and of the SNCF, or of the administrative judge. It
should be clear, as Robert Paxton observed in the conclusion of his
work, La France de Vichy, 1940–1944, quoted by Jean Massot in the
Revue administrative, that we are incapable of knowing what we
would have done under the same circumstances. In another vein, in a
conversation reported by Josy Eisenberg, Adin Steinsaltz remarked
that, despite considerable progress made since biblical times and
regardless of the various circumstances and customs of the times,
humanity has never succeeded in inventing new sins.
The subject matter jurisdiction of this Court to rule on the
government‘s noncontractual liability in the case at hand is not
contested by any party to the litigation. Indeed, whatever the gravity
of the infringement to individual freedoms that the measures taken by
the authorities of the Haute-Garonne caused to Mr. Georges Lipietz
and the S. family, these measures are based on the aforementioned
provisions of Article 1 of the October 4, 1940 ―law,‖12 and therefore
it cannot be said that they may not be linked to the enforcement of a
legislative text or regulation within the meaning of the Jurisdictional
Court‘s13 case law on the definition of voie de fait:14 On that topic, see
the TC,15 June 20, 1994, Madaci and Youbi case (advisory opinion by
12. Pursuant to this law, foreign Jews could be assigned forced residences and
interned in special camps. For the text of the law and commentary, see REMY,
supra note 1, at 91–92. (VGC).
13. Translator‘s note: the Jurisdictional Court is known as the Tribunal des
conflits (“TC”).
14. Translator‘s note: under French administrative law, the voie de fait, which
does not appear to have an American English legal equivalent, is an egregious
illegal act by the administration constituting an assault on an individual‘s personal
liberty or property rights. When an act falls under the definition of voie de fait,
French administrative law considers the administrative nature of the act to be lost.
Therefore, that act can no longer be an administrative act subject to the
administrative law judge‘s jurisdiction but has to be subject to a civil jurisdiction.
15. See supra note 13. (VGC).
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Abraham) on the absence of voie de fait in the enforcement of a
deportation order that may have violated the provisions of the
ECtHR. Concerning the jurisdiction of this Court to rule on possible
misconduct committed by the civil administrations of the government
due to the application of anti-Semitic legislation of the so-called
French State,16 and regardless of the gravity of the attack against
individual liberty, see also implicitly the CE,17 April 12, 2002, Papon
case (advisory opinion by Sophie Boissard).
More delicate is the issue of this Court‘s jurisdiction over a
noncontractual liability action brought against the SNCF. The rail
company asserts lack of jurisdiction as its principal defense.
It is clear that, at the time of the facts in dispute, the SNCF was
governed by the agreement of August 31, 1937 which had been
approved by executive decree of the same date and by the October
10, 1943 ―law‖ that served to reorganize the SNCF‘s board of
directors, under the terms of which the SNCF—notwithstanding the
fact that the government owned the majority of its capital and half of
the seats on its board—became a limited liability company, subject to
certain exemptions from the common law, thus as a corporation
under private law. It is also worth noting that, in a similar
noncontractual liability action brought against the SNCF by Mr.
Schaechter, whose parents had also been transported by the railway
company from the Haute-Garonne for purposes of deportation, the
Paris Court of First Instance, in a judgment dated May 14, 2003, and
the Paris Court of Appeals, in a judgment dated June 8, 2004,
implicitly deemed themselves to have jurisdiction over the case.
The criteria under which this Court recognizes its jurisdiction over
a noncontractual liability action against a private individual were
specified by the CE in the March 23, 1983 case of SA Bureau Veritas
(advisory opinion by Denoix de Saint-Marc), concerning harm
attributed to a limited company active in the governmental service
administration of aviation safety. These criteria are three-fold: first,
the institution of private law must participate in the ―delivery of
government service; second, to this end, the institution of private law
must be vested with governmental power prerogatives; and finally,
the harm for which compensation is sought must have been caused
16. See supra note 11. (VGC).
17. Translator‘s note: CE stands for Conseil d’Etat, the highest administrative
law court in France.
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―in conduct within the scope of government power prerogatives
conferred to it for the enforcement of the government service
mission‖ with which it is vested.
In the case at hand, as regards the criteria of participation in the
fulfillment of a mission of administrative government service, even if
it is clear that the SNCF had preserved as its principal activity at the
time of the facts in dispute the provision of industrial and commercial
passenger transport by rail, it is nevertheless also clear that the
individuals interned on racial grounds, who were transported by the
railway company from the internment premises of the so-called free
zone18 to the Drancy camp, were not traveling as passengers of this
commercial and industrial government service, since they were
transported against their will. It is also clear from the pretrial judicial
investigation, particularly the report entitled La SNCF sous
l’occupation allemande, 1940–1944,19 written at the request of the
SNCF by Christian Bachelier, a researcher at the CNRS,20 and made
public in September 1996, that the transportation of individuals
interned on racial grounds was not organized by the German
Occupation authorities, who either would have reserved train cars on
pre-existing convoys or commandeered them from the national
company; rather, it was organized by the SNCF under orders given
by the administrative services of the Ministry of the Interior of the socalled French State.21 The above-referenced transfers were subject to
a specific SNCF accounting system designated as either ―Ministry of
the Interior transfers‖ or ―transfers of Hebrews,‖ and billed to the
Ministry of the Interior, each bill specifying the administrative
division that had requested the transport.
Under these conditions, having transported Mr. Lipietz and the S.
family, along with tens of thousands of other individuals interned on
racial grounds, from the Haute-Garonne to Paris-Austerlitz, it appears
18. The ―free zone‖ is another way of referring to the part of France that
originally was not occupied by the German military. After invading the north of
France in June 1940 and France‘s formal capitulation by an armistice on June 22,
1940, the German army found it more cost-effective to remain in the north. They
invaded the rest of France in November, 1942, following the Allied landing in
North Africa. See generally ROBERT O. PAXTON & MICHAEL MARRUS, VICHY
FRANCE AND THE JEWS (1981). (VGC).
19. The SNCF under German Occupation, 1940–1944.
20. Centre national de la recherche scientifique (National Center for Scientific
Research).
21. See supra note 11. (VGC).
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to us that the SNCF must be considered to have executed not an
industrial and commercial service of transporting passengers but
rather an administrative government service mission, in the sense that
the government of the so-called French State22 conceived of the
notion of government service; namely, the transportation of
individuals interned on racial grounds with a view to their future
deportation.
Having identified the existence of an administrative government
service mission, the two other criteria for jurisdiction do not present
much difficulty. The SNCF‘s exercise of governmental power
prerogatives in carrying out its transportation services can in fact be
deduced from the ever-present duress that clouded these transports,
since not only were the parties transported against their will, but they
also did not want to be transported under the aforementioned
conditions that were contrary to human dignity.
Finally, the harms for which the petitioners seek compensation
from the SNCF are inherent in the exercise of these governmental
power prerogatives; namely, in the duress that was imposed on them
or their successors in interest both in being transported to ParisAusterlitz for deportation and in having been transported under such
conditions.
Given the combination of the execution of an administrative
government service mission, the exercise of governmental power
prerogatives and the attribution of the harm to the exercise of these
prerogatives, the noncontractual liability action brought by Messrs. S.
and the Lipietz parties against the SNCF, in our view,
notwithstanding the contrary opinion held by the Paris Court of
Appeals in the Schaechter case, falls within the purview of the
subject matter jurisdiction of this Court. This Court will thus reject
the lack of jurisdiction defense raised by the SNCF.
The geographical jurisdiction of this Court to hear the present
action for noncontractual liability has not been disputed by any party
to this litigation. Indeed, Article R. 312-14 of the CJA provides that
―liability actions based on a cause of action other than breach of
contract or quasi-contract and filed against the government . . . or . . .
private institutions managing a governmental service are subject to:
1. the jurisdiction of the administrative court when the alleged tort is
22. See supra note 11. (VGC).
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attributable to a decision . . . , which could have been subject to an
action for annulment before that court; 2. the jurisdiction of the
administrative court in the location or where the cause of the injury
has occurred, where the alleged harm . . . is attributable to . . . a fact
or an administrative reaction . . . .‖ In this case, on the one hand,
regarding the injury attributed to the services of the Haute-Garonne
administration, the administrative internment measure taken against
Mr. Lipietz and the S. family could have been subject to an action for
annulment before this Court, if it had existed under its current
denomination and more importantly if it had possessed its current
jurisdictional powers at the time of the measure in question; on the
other hand, regarding the injury attributed to the SNCF, the cause
originated with the transfer of the parties over to the railway
company by the administrative services of the Haute-Garonne
administration for transport to Drancy and subsequent deportation.
*
The admissibility of claims for damages made primarily by the
petitioners does not raise any difficulties.
First, the litigation is linked to the rejection, whether implicit or
explicit, of the prior requests made on September 6, 2001 by Messrs.
Georges Lipietz and Guidéon S. and addressed respectively to the
administrator of the Haute-Garonne and to the SNCF.
Second, although it is undisputed that Mrs. Stéphanie S., mother of
the two petitioners, and Mr. Jacques S., father of Mr. Guidéon S.,
died prior to the commencement of this action for damages, Mr. and
Mrs. Jacques and Stéphanie S.‘ potential right to compensation began
upon the occurrence of the facts that could have proximately caused
the harm and before their death created patrimony rights in their
respective successors in interest: see in this regard CE March 29,
2000, Assistance Publique – Hôpitaux de Paris, No. 195662
(advisory opinion by Chauvaux). The potential right to compensation
of Mr. Georges Lipietz, who died during the proceedings, was also
transmitted to his successors in interest.
The memorandum of law presented on May 8, 2006 by Messrs. S.
and Lipietz et al. presents a different pleading than the above.
Indeed, with respect first to the arguments for voiding the two
decisions of the Secretary of Defense dated April 24, 2006 that
involved the four-year period for extinguishing claims, the latter
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constitute, despite the petitioners‘ arguments to the contrary, opinions
about abuse of power : see the CE May 2, 1973 Sieur Guyot case
(advisory opinion by Gentot) that revisited the case law derived from
the CE Maigret judgment of May 26, 1937 and which was recently
confirmed by the CE June 25, 2004 Feind case (advisory opinion by
Piveteau). Certainly, when the arguments for voiding a decision that
applied the four-year claim extinction or limitations period are
combined in the same claim, with the primary argument being for
damages, the CE finds it is a proper administration of justice that the
litigation against the statute of limitations defense be examined as
part of the main case: see in this respect the Piveteau opinion in the
aforementioned June 25, 2004 CE Feind case. But, in the present
case, not only were the findings regarding the abuse of power in the
decisions of April 24, 2006 not addressed in the initial petition,
recorded November 14, 2001, but they also were not introduced in a
separate petition that this Court could have, if time permitted, joined
with the first, notwithstanding the rules of geographical jurisdiction,
given its connection within the meaning of Article R. 342-1 of the
CJA. Presented in reverse order in a later supplementary
memorandum, dated November 14, 2001, these arguments take on
the appearance of new arguments.
Second, the claims for damages made in the same memorandum
also take on the characteristics of new claims, since the legal theory
on which compensation is sought, namely the nonpecuniary harm
allegedly committed against the successors in interest to Georges
Lipietz by the notification of a decision applying the four-year statute
of limitations against their deceased husband and father is separate
from the principal legal theory of injury on which compensation is
claimed. Furthermore, it does not appear that a prior request23
preceded this petition for compensation.
We therefore can only conclude that a denial is in order for the
latter claims on the basis of their inadmissibility.
*
Regarding the merits of the action for damages brought by the
petitioners, the administrator of the Haute-Garonne and the SNCF
23. Such a prior request, in the form of a letter written to the alleged wrongdoer,
is required in certain situations before a claim may be brought in an administrative
court. (VGC).
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both enter a defense based on the expiration of the statute of
limitations.
This, in our opinion, is the most delicate issue of the litigation.
This Court in effect will have two sets of issues to decide
successively; namely, first, the identification of the applicable statute
of limitations with respect to both the petitioners‘ claim against the
government and against the SNCF, and secondly, once this has been
identified, this Court must determine the point at which said
limitation period started to run with respect to both the government
and the SNCF.
Regarding the applicable statute of limitations, the administrator of
the Haute-Garonne, who, as has been stated, adopts the written
arguments of the Secretary of Defense, intends to rely primarily on
the four-year statute of limitations provided by Article 9 of the
amended January 29, 1831 law regarding . . . the expiration of the
rights of creditors of the government and, in the alternative, shall rely
on the ten-year statute of limitation mentioned in Article 2270-1 of
the Civil Code. For its part, the SNCF relies primarily on the fouryear statute of limitation provided by Article 1 of law No. 68-1250 of
December 31, 1968 on the limitation of claims against the national
government, the départements,24 the communes,25 and public
institutions and, in the alternative, relies on the aforementioned tenyear statute of limitations in Article 2270-1 of the Civil Code.
Mr. S. and the Lipietz parties dispute the applicability of all of
these statutes of limitation on the grounds that their liability action is
not amenable to any limitations period under the provisions of the
single article of law No. 64-1326 of December 26, 1964, which
establishes that crimes against humanity are beyond the reach of any
statute of limitations and according to which ―crimes against
humanity, as defined by the UN resolution of February 13, 1946,
noting the definition of crimes against humanity as it appears in the
Charter of the International Tribunal of August 8, 1945, are
imprescriptible by their nature.‖ The plaintiffs, who maintain that the
wrongs attributed to the administrative services of the Haute-Garonne
24. See supra note 2. (VGC).
25. A commune is the smallest French division of administration which has the
dual attributes of being a local collectivity and a national administrative area. See
generally GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 184, 292 (3d ed., 2009); REMI
ROUQUETTE, DICTIONNAIRE DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 160 (2002). (VGC).
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Prefecture and the SNCF should be classified as crimes against
humanity or as complicity in crimes against humanity, rely in this
regard on the advisory opinion by Stéphane Austry in the Pelletier
case in the CE dated April 6, 2001, according to which ―the
jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation on
the imprescriptibility of the civil suit for damages resulting from
crimes against humanity . . . necessarily (would extend to) suits
aimed at triggering the government‘s liability for such damages,
whether liability is sought before a judge of the judicial branch or
through an administrative proceeding.‖
It should be noted that this interpretation of the Criminal Chamber
of the Court of Cassation‘s decisions was contested by Sophie
Boissard in her advisory opinion in the Papon case, CE, dated April
5, 2002, above.
In order to settle the debate, it is appropriate to refer to those
decisions. Article 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
―the civil action is subject to limitations periods as stipulated by the
rules of the Civil Code. In any event, such an action no longer can be
brought before the criminal court after the expiration of the statute of
limitations applicable to the public law [i.e., criminal law]
action . . . .‖ On the basis of these provisions, the Criminal Chamber
of the Court of Cassation held in the Touvier case dated June 1, 1995
that ―when brought before the criminal court, a civil action finds
itself, based on Article 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, bound
by the same statute of limitations as would apply in a criminal suit
(and) that, therefore, the absence of any statute of limitations for
crimes against humanity applies both to the criminal and civil actions
that may result from such crimes.‖26
As the SNCF argues in its defense, it appears clear to us from the
terms of the above judgment that it is only in the event that a civil
action is brought before a criminal court, by way of a civil party, that
such an action [i.e., for a crime against humanity] is imprescriptible.
Moreover, it cannot be otherwise without overstepping the authority
of this Court‘s jurisdiction, since it is not for this Court , any more
than for the civil law courts, to decide whether the actions of the
administrator of the Haute-Garonne and the SNCF potentially
26. Civil actions generally are brought in France as part of criminal prosecutions
under a procedure in which the victim is constituted as a ―civil party‖ in the
criminal action (partie civile). (VGC).
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constituted a crime against humanity or complicity in crimes against
humanity against Mr. Georges Lipietz and the S. family.
As for the actions brought before courts having different
jurisdictions, the plaintiffs cannot successfully argue, in our view,
that the enactment by the legislature of distinct statutes of limitations
before the criminal court and before the administrative judge
disregards the provisions of Article 6, Sections 1 and 14 of the
European Convention of Human Rights.
Therefore, Mr. . S. and the Lipietz parties do not appear to us to be
entitled to argue that their action for liability would lie beyond the
reach of any statute of limitations.
*
The basis for imprescriptibility having been rejected, what remains
is to define the statute of limitations applicable to this litigation.
Regarding the claim of the petitioners against the government,
Article 2227 of the Civil Code provides in its original wording based
on the March 15, 1804 law, which remains in force to this day, that
the ―government . . . (is) subject to the same limitations periods as
private individuals and also (may) invoke them.‖
Nevertheless, Article 9 of the January 29, 1831 law cited above
provides, in the form adopted based on Article 1 of the executive
decree of October 30, 1935 concerning the extension of the four-year
statute of limitations loss of rights defense to the départements27 and
communes,28 effective until December 31, 1945, that ―lapsed in time
and definitively extinguished to the benefit of the government . . .
without prejudice with respect to statutory limitations provided for by
prior laws are all claims which, not having been paid before the end
of the fiscal period to which they belong, could not . . . for want of
sufficient justification have been settled, approved for payment, and
paid within a period of four years starting from the opening of the
fiscal year . . . .‖
The same Article 9 of the January 29, 1831 law provides in its text,
based on Article 148 of law No. 45-0195 of December 31, 1945,
setting the general budget (civil services) for the year 1946, effective
until December 31, 1968, that ―lapsed in time and permanently
27. See supra note 2. (VGC).
28. See supra note 25. (VGC).
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extinguished to the benefit of the government . . . without prejudice
with respect to statutory limitations provided for by prior laws . . . are
all claims which, not having been paid before the end of the fiscal
period to which they belong, could not have been settled, approved
for payment, and paid within a period of four years starting from the
opening of the fiscal period for creditors domiciled in Europe . . . .‖
To implement the aforementioned provisions of Article 9 of the
January 29, 1831 law in its successive drafts, the minister ordering
the payment need only invoke the four-year statute of limitations on
behalf of the government: see in this regard CE, October 11, 1961,
Ministre des travaux publics et des transports c./ sieur Seveyras
(advisory opinion by Bernard).
Article 1 of the previously cited law No. 68-1250 of December 31,
1968, effective from January 1, 1969, provides in its first paragraph
that ―extinguished due to time-lapse to the benefit of the
government . . . without prejudice with respect to particular statutory
limitations mandated by law and without prejudice with respect to the
provisions of the present law are all claims that have not been paid
within a period of four years commencing from the first day of the
year following the year during which the rights were acquired.‖
Article 9 of the same law provides that ―the provisions of this law
shall apply to claims arising prior to the date of its entry into force
and which have not yet lapsed at that date . . . .‖
Article 10 of the same law provides that ―all provisions contrary to
the provisions of this law are repealed, specifically Articles 9 . . . and
10 of the amended law of January 29, 1831.‖
To implement these provisions, Article 2 of executive decree No.
98-81 of February 11, 1998 . . . regarding the decisions made by the
government concerning the four-year statute of limitations specifies
that ―the primary or secondary ordonnateurs29 have the authority to
invoke the four-year statute of limitations as far as claims against the
government are related to the expenditures that the ordonnateurs
have authorized.‖
In our view, from the above provisions of Article 9 of the January
29, 1831 law and Article 1 of the December 31, 1968 law,
29. Translator‘s note: in French administrative terms, ordonnateur is used to
describe the individual authorized to mandate a public expenditure.
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successively in force, it follows that these laws imposed, with respect
to claims against the government, a four-year period for the
extinction of the government‘s debt,30 and subsequently a four-year
statute of limitations, which explicitly derogates from the principle
stated in Article 2227 of the Civil Code, whereby the State would be
subject to the same statutory limitations periods as individuals and is
absolutely general in scope, except in cases where an explicit
statutory provision to the contrary applies and provides for a shorter
or longer statute of limitations: see in this regard with respect to the
earlier law for the extinction of the government‘s debt,31 CE October
20, 1943 Sieur Panhard (advisory opinion by Leonard) and CE
November 29, 1963 URSSAF Loiret (advisory opinion by Chardeau),
as relates implicitly to the implementation of the four-year lapse
under Article 9 of the January 29, 1831 law; as relates explicitly, see
CE November 29, 1963, URSSAF du Loiret (advisory opinion by
Chardeau).
In the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary,
the claim that the petitioners assert against the government, based on
the noncontractual liability of the collectivity with respect to the
alleged wrongs committed by the administrative services of the
Haute-Garonne , can be subject only to either the four-year law for
the extinction of claims against the government under Article 9 of the
January 29, 1831 law or the four-year limitations period referred to in
Article 1 of the December 31, 1968 law.
The applicability of either one these two statutory limitations
schemes depends, under the above provisions of Article 9 of the
December 31, 1968 law, on the possible acquisition of the four-year
time lapse of January 1, 1969, the date on which the December 31,
1968 law entered into force and, thus, the starting point of the statute
of limitations that has been chosen for this present litigation. Thus, in
a noncontractual liability action brought against the government for
enforcing the ―law‖ of the government of the so-called French State32
by requiring forced labor on behalf of the enemy, the Administrative
Court of Nice, in a judgment dated April 4, 2006, Mr. Louis Rouge,
selected May 1945 as the starting point of the running of the
30. The reference to this period is to the more rigorous limitations law that
preceded the current one. See déchéance quadriennale in ROUQUETTE, supra note
25, at 226. (VGC).
31. See supra note 20. (VGC).
32. See supra, note 11. (VGC).
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limitations period and, subsequently, applied only the provisions of
Article 9 of the January 29, 1831 law, such that, given this starting
point of the running of the statute of limitations, the four-year lapse
was attained as of January 1, 1969, according to that jurisdiction.
In this case, we believe that the statute of limitations defense
invoked by the administrator of the Haute-Garonne, based primarily
on the earlier four-year limitations period provided for in the January
29, 1831 law, should be rectified and examined as it related to both
the four-year lapse mechanism of the law of 1831 and the four-year
statute of limitations of the December 31, 1968 law. It should be
noted, however, that although the administrator of the Haute-Garonne
has the authority, under the above provisions of Article 2 of the
executive decree of February 11, 1998 as a secondary ordonnateur33
of public expenditures, to invoke on behalf of the government the
four-year limitation period of the 1968 law against a claim based on
wrongdoing committed by its services, he is not authorized,
according to the previously analyzed provisions of Article 9 of the
January 29, 1831 law, to invoke on behalf of the government the
four-year extinction of debt mechanism under that Article: see in this
regard the above-cited ruling of the CE, October 11, 1961, Ministre
des travaux publics et des transports c./ sieur Seveyras.
*
Regarding the plaintiffs‘ reparations claim against the SNCF,
Article 1, Paragraph 2, of law No. 68-1250 of December 31, 1968,
cited earlier, provides in its second paragraph that ―claims against
public institutions having a government accountant are limited to the
same statutory period (four years from the first day of the year
following that during which the rights were acquired) and under the
same reservation (of the provisions of this law).‖
Under the provisions of amended Article 18 of the law No. 821153 of December 30, 1982 regarding national transport, the SNCF is
endowed with the status of commercial and industrial public
establishment commencing from January 1, 1983. Nevertheless,
under the provisions of Article 25 of the same law, the rail industry
―is subject, in matters of accounting and financial management, to the
rules applicable to commercial companies,‖ that is to say to the
accounting rules of private law, and is thus not provided with a public
33. See supra note 29. (VGC).
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accountant. It ensues from this that, in application the above-cited
provisions of Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the law of December 31,
1968, the SNCF is not entitled to invoke in its defense the four-year
statute of limitations provided by this article.
On the other hand, Article 2227 of the Civil Code provides that
―public establishments . . . are subject to the same limitations as
individuals and may also invoke them.‖ Article 2270-1 of this same
Code provides that ―noncontractual civil liability actions are barred
ten years from the manifestation of the harm . . . .‖
Finally, Article 2262 of the above-cited Code provides that ―all
actions, whether in rem or in personam, are limited to thirty years
before the individual alleging the prescription is obligated to adduce a
title . . . .‖
It follows in our view from the combination of the above-cited
provisions of Articles 2227 and 2270-1 of the Civil Code that the
reparations claim filed by the plaintiffs against the SNCF, based on
the noncontractual liability of the company for its acts of misconduct,
is subject to the ten-year statute of limitations provided in Article
2270-1, as the thirty-year statute of limitations found in Article 2262
of the Code has an ancillary nature.
*
Having thus defined the applicable statute of limitations for the
claim of Mr. S. and the LIPIETZ parties, against both the government
and the SNCF, we now shall determine the point at which the said
statute of limitations began to run, with respect to both the
government and the SNCF.
Regarding the petitioners‘ claim against the government, Article
10 of the law of January 29, 1831, amended and cited above,
provides, in the draft derived from Article 2 of the executive decree
of October 30, 1935 which was in force until December 31, 1968,
that ―the provisions of the article (9 of the same law that prescribed
the four-year statute extinguishing claims against the government) are
not applicable to claims whose order to pay and payment could not
have been completed within the time limit that was started by the
administration‘s action . . . .‖
Article 3 of the above-cited law No. 68-1250 of December 31
1968, in force commencing from January 1, 1969, provides that ―the
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statute of limitations (of four years for claims against the government
found in Article 1 of the same law) runs neither against the creditor
who cannot act . . . due to force majeure, nor against anyone who can
be deemed legitimately in ignorance of the existence of his
claim . . . .‖
The above-cited provisions of Article 3 of the law of December 31
1968 have, in our view, primarily been aimed at incorporating into
the law the court-based interpretation of the above-cited provisions
found in Article 10 of the law of January 29, 1831. Indeed, on the
basis of these latter provisions, the CE indicated that the four-year
period for extinguishing claims would not begin to run when a public
creditor was left in legitimate lack of awareness of a claim by his
administration: see, in this regard, CE February 14, 1973, Commune
de Pastricciola (advisory opinion by Boutet). This decision recently
was confirmed by the CE, based on the provisions of Article 3 of the
law of December 31, 1968 concerning the four-year statute of
limitations, in a November 16, 2005 judgment, MM. Auguste et
commune de Nogent sur Marne (advisory opinion by Didier Casas).
The notion of legitimate lack of awareness assumes, however, that
the state of positive law does not allow for the individual who is
subject to the administration to be aware of the existence of the
claim, meaning that a simple illegal legislative interpretation by the
administration would not suffice, at least in terms of the 1968 law, to
render the individual to be deemed legitimately unaware of the claim:
see, in this regard, CE May 20, 1994, Gouelo (advisory opinion by
Mrs. Denis-Linton).
In this case, the event causing the claim that the plaintiffs are filing
against the government was the administrative internment measure
taken on May 8, 1944 by the administration services of the HauteGaronne against Mr. Lipietz and the S. family, followed by the
transfer of the parties to the SNCF by the same services on May 10,
1944 with the goal of transporting them to the Drancy camp and
ultimately deporting them. It seems clear to us that, given the
conditions of their internment, both in the Haute-Garonne from May
8 to 10, 1944 and in Drancy from May 11 to August 17, 1944, Mr.
Georges Lipietz and Mr. Guidéon S. were in any event until their
liberation on August 17, 1944 rendered incapable by an act of the
administration, within the meaning of Article 10 of the law of
January 29, 1831, of filing a claim against the government. The ―act
of the administration,‖ in the preferred meaning of this term,
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corresponds to the notion of force majeure within the context of
Article 3 of the law of December 31, 1968.
The issue of force majeure does not arise, however, except to the
extent that the state of positive law would have allowed the relevant
parties to become aware of the existence of their claim against the
government. Messrs. Lipietz and S. would not, in fact, have been able
to file effectively a noncontractual liability claim against the
government for wrongs committed by the administrative services of
the Haute-Garonne except insofar as the administrative internment
measure taken against them could have been subject effectively to an
action for annulment; that is, so that it would have been deemed
misconduct pursuant to the judicial interpretations of that time period.
However, nothing seems less likely.
It is undisputed that the internment measure at issue was taken
based on the above-cited provisions of Article 1 of the ―law‖ of
October 4, 1940 on ―foreign nationals of the Jewish race,‖ combined
with the provisions of the ―law‖ of October 22, 1940 on the review of
naturalizations34 and of the ―law‖ of June 2, 1941 that replaced the
―law‖ of October 3, 1940 on the status of Jews.35
First of all, at the time these provisions were implemented, the CE
had transposed its Arrighi case law of November 6, 1936, first
implicitly and then explicitly, via the Vincent judgment of March 22,
1944 (advisory opinion by Detton), declaring itself unqualified to rule
on the content of the ―laws‖ of the so-called French State.36 The CE
made this declaration even though the ―laws‖ emanated from the sole
executive of the so-called French State, that is to say from a
governmental body possessing regulatory power, as Professor Julien
Laferrière highlighted in his work, Nouveau droit public de la France
(New French Public Law), published in 1941. Thus, Messrs. Lipietz
and S. would not have been able to challenge effectively before an
administrative judge the legality of the new legislation applied to
34. The French courts were permitted to denaturalize French citizens who had
obtained citizenship under the naturalization law of 1927. See Rouquette, supra
note 3, at 305 n.3. (VGC).
35. It was the combination of these laws that made foreign-born Jews who were
French citizens vulnerable to internment in French camps and, ultimately,
deportation to Nazi concentration and death camps earlier during the war than were
French-born Jews. (VGC).
36. See supra, note 11.
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them by the administrative services of the Haute-Garonne until the
entry into force of the executive order of August 9, 1944 pertaining to
the reestablishment of republican legality on the continental territory.
This would apply to ―laws‖ implementing discrimination based on
having the legal status of being Jewish as well as ―laws‖ establishing
measures that deprived individuals of their freedom.
Secondly, the ability for Messrs. Lipietz and S. to challenge
effectively before an administrative judge the Jewish status imposed
upon them by the administrative services of the Haute-Garonne prior
to the entry into force of this same executive order hardly seems any
more likely. In their written submissions, the plaintiffs have indicated
that, at the time of their administrative internment, Mr. S. and his
parents were in possession of false baptismal certificates and Mr.
Lipietz had not been circumcised. It is undeniable that during this
time many French or foreign Jews managed to escape deportation by
using baptismal certificates that were either counterfeit or created
upon request, which some administrative authorities agreed to accept.
However, such documents would not have convinced an
administrative judge. Indeed, while Jewish status was based, pursuant
both to the provisions of the ―law‖ of October 3, 1940 and those of
the ―law‖ of June 2, 1941, on the grandparents‘ having been Jewish,
the CE, through two en banc cases of April 24, 1942 and April 2,
1943, Sieur Bloch-Favier (advisory opinion by Léonard) and Dame
Lang (advisory opinion by Lagrange), interpreted these texts in the
manner least favorable to the interested parties: first, according to
these decisions, the administrative authority had the right to presume
an individual to be Jewish based merely on his patronymic name, as
in the Bloch-Favier case; secondly, this presumption could not
effectively be rebutted except by affirmative proof to the contrary
that the grandparents had not been Jewish. The fact that the
grandparents had been married in an evangelical church would not
suffice to establish their non-Jewishness in this regard, as in the
Dame Lang case. Some CE cases did allow that the proof as to nonJewishness had been satisfied by petitioners, the government
commissioner Odent emphasizing along these lines in his advisory
opinion in the Michelson case of December 31, 1943 that ―a weak
presumption may be destroyed by an equally weak proof.‖
Nevertheless, until the executive order of August 9, 1944 entered into
force, the criteria laid out in principle by the jurisprudence
concerning the application of anti-Semitic legislation enacted by the
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so-called French State did not change: in a comment of the CE Sieur
Rosengart case of January 12, 1944 (advisory opinion by Chénot),
the commentator of the Lebon reports, published in 1946, was able to
note laconically that ―this jurisprudence places a burden of proof on
the plaintiffs that is often difficult to establish, particularly when it
concerns the grandparents‘ religion.‖ In light of this jurisprudence,
we believe that Messrs. Lipietz and S. would not have been able to
contest effectively in an administrative court the Jewish status that
had been attributed to them by the administrative services of the
Haute-Garonne.
Finally, regarding the legality of the liberty-depriving measure
taken against the interested parties, the administrative judge‘s control
over the situation was at the time particularly constrained. In terms of
outward legality, the CE deemed, in Dame Koch, May 16, 1941
(advisory opinion by Puget), that an administrative order of
internment did not have to be explanatory or reasoned, in the absence
of any legislative or regulatory provision requiring the same. In a
decision that came after the reestablishment of republican law, Sieur
Bosquain, on February 19, 1947 (advisory opinion by Barjot), the CE
in addition specified that the fact that the administrative internment
order had not been in writing, which seemed to have happened, was
not an omission that could render the order null and void. In terms of
internal legality, the CE, in the same Dame Koch case, explicitly
affirmed by the same Sieur Bosquain case, deemed that ―the
appropriateness of the measure‖ could not be argued before it in
litigation, meaning that the CE refused to review possible errors in
judgment made by the administrative authority. On the same issue of
internal legality, the CE accepted, in the above-referenced Sieur
Bosquain case, the legality, based on a theory of exceptional
circumstances, of an administrative internment order within
penitentiary facilities, which was also the case in the instant situation.
In light of such jurisprudence, it does not appear likely to us that a
possible action for abuse of power begun by Messrs. Lipietz and S.
regarding the liberty-depriving measure taken against them by the
administrative services of the Haute-Garonne could have succeeded.
As a result, in the absence of illegal misconduct capable of being
imputed to the aforementioned administrative services under the law
prior to the reestablishment of republican legality, the plaintiffs were
in legitimate ignorance, in our view, of the existence of any claim
against the government before the entry into force of the August 9,
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1944 executive order.
In terms of such a claim, therefore, and under the above-analyzed
provisions of Article 10 of the Law of January 29, 1831, the four-year
statute of limitation did not begin to run until the month of August
1944.
It remains to be determined, however, whether the plaintiffs could
be considered to have remained legitimately unaware of their claim
against the government following the entry into force of the order of
the Provisional Government of the French Republic of August 9,
1944 on the reestablishment of republican legality on the continental
territory.
The legal significance of this order is as extensive as it is complex.
The orders of the Provisional Government of the French Republic,
although emanating from the government—that is to say from a body
exercising regulatory power—were given legislative value by the CE:
see in this regard the Botton case of February 22, 1946 (advisory
opinion by Detton) regarding an order of the French committee of
national Liberation that transposed the solution established by the
aforementioned Vincent judgment of March 22, 1944 for the socalled laws of the so-called French State.37 The August 9, 1944 order,
which had long been debated within the judicial bodies of Free
France, had been drafted by René Cassin, president of the judicial
committee of Free France and future vice-president of the Conseil
d‘Etat following the purging of that high body. As explained earlier,
the executive order affirms, in the first paragraph of Article 2, the
principle of ab initio nullity of the ―laws‖ of the so-called French
State but specifies in the second paragraph of the same Article that
―such nullification must be expressly stated.‖ Although the abovecited provisions of Article 3 of the order specifically mention, among
the ―laws‖ for which nullity is expressly stated, ―all those which
establish or apply any discrimination whatsoever based on being
Jewish,‖ it follows from the combination of provisions within the
order that only the special legislation deriving from the so-called
government of the French State is considered invalid, the remainder
of the legislative or regulatory acts passed since June 16, 1940 having
been retroactively validated. The order is, however, not limited to
operating such a division among acts of the so-called French State‘s
37. See supra note 11. (VGC).
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government; it affirms not only, in the first sentence of Article 1, that
―the form of the French government is and remains a republic‖ but
also, in the second sentence of the same Article, that ―in law, (the
Republic) has not ceased to exist‖; in the same sense, the political
regime that the order ends is defined not as the ―previous regime‖
but, in Article 7 of the same order, as ―the de facto authority calling
itself the ‗Government of the French State.‘‖ In our view, the
normative value, which for a long time was conferred and then
recently denied by courts to the provisions found in the second
sentence of Article 1 of the August 9, 1944 Order, determined in the
period following the order the applicable law on the public
authority‘s liability for the implementation of the special legislation
of the so-called French State.
The consequences of the entry into force of the August 9, 1944
order on the outcome of actions for annulment against individual
administrative acts based on anti-Semitic legislation of the said
government were not surprising: in an initial judgment on October
11, 1944, called Dame Wallerstein (advisory opinion by Odent), the
CE could only observe a failure to adjudicate. The commentator of
the Lebon reports nonetheless expressed his regret that the CE had
confined itself to such a ―simplistic‖ account and had refrained from
formulating a precedent-setting principle.
The leading case, following an initial case called Dame
Chpolansky on November 30, 1945 (advisory opinion by Detton)
with laconic reasoning, was a judgment of the en banc assembly,
Ganascia, of June 14, 1946, regarding a compensatory action under
the presidency of René Cassin (advisory opinion by Odent). Mr.
Ganascia, a magistrate based in Algeria, sought to hold the
government liable for several wrongs that had led to his dismissal by
the Governor General of Algeria in December 1940, on the basis of
the provisions of the so-called ―law‖ of October 3, 1940 on Jewish
status. In this case, to which the Sirey reports commentator attributed
―great theoretical and practical significance,‖ while simultaneously
formulating ―reservations‖ regarding the solution adopted, the CE
rejected the petitioner‘s arguments, holding that the individuals to
which the special legislation—retroactively annulled—had applied,
had no right to any monetary reparations if the law did not expressly
provide for any, as the retroactive voiding of the special legislation
also applied, according to the judge, to the consequences of the harm
caused by the legislation‘s implementation. Mr. Ganascia thus could
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not seek any monetary reparations beyond the restoration of the
salary that he should have received, in conformity with the provisions
of the order of the Provisional Government of the French Republic
applicable to his case.
The rule adopted in the Ganascia decision concerning the harmful
effects of the implementation of the anti-Semitic legislation of the socalled the French State38 was affirmed repeatedly in other cases on
the harmful effects of measures depriving or restricting individual
freedom based on the special legislation of the same government,
despite the reservations, even embarrassment, of certain government
commissioners such as Raymond Odent: see in this regard the Viénot
case (advisory opinion by Lefas) of April 23, 1947 on an
administrative internment measure and the Epoux Girard case of
January 3, 1952 under the presidency of René Cassin (advisory
opinion by Barbet) on house arrest measures, or the Vincent case of
February 11, 1959.
Applying a limited temperament to this jurisprudence has only
reinforced, in our view, its principal criteria. In the Toprower en banc
judgment on January 30, 1948, under the presidency of René Cassin
with dissenting opinion by Célier, the CE effectively recognized the
right of Mr. Toprower, a Romanian Jew severely crippled following
his administrative internment in the Gurs camp, to obtain reparations.
Nevertheless, the CE allowed for governmental liability only after
noting, in conformity with the arguments of plaintiff‘s counsel, that
the damages incurred by Mr. Toprower were caused by the ―living
conditions and ill-treatment to which he [had been] subjected by the
personnel in charge of security and management‖ of the camp, which
constituted ―governmental service misconduct separate from the
implementation of the internment measure taken against‖ the
claimant. The judicial principle, according to which simply
implementing special legislation passed by the so-called government
of the French State would not automatically lead to liability on the
part of the post-war government, had thus not been challenged by the
Toprower case.
It is worth noting that in this case, by contrast, Messrs. Lipietz and
S. did not raise any issue of excessive behavior on the part of the
agents of the Haute-Garonne administration; rather, they contest the
38. See supra note 11. (VGC).
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very legality of the administrative internment measure taken against
them. We believe that, in the same vein as the above-cited Toprower
case, the CE implicitly concluded, in the Dame Duez case of
February 22, 1950 (advisory opinion by Odent), that the fatal
automobile accident caused by a vehicle belonging to the so-called
French militia,39 whose act of creation had been retroactively
invalidated by the August 9, 1944 executive order, constituted
governmental service misconduct separate from the mission of
maintaining public order that had been conferred to this group by the
government of the so-called French State,40 in the sense that the said
government defined public order. It is worth noting that, in a set of
different circumstances, the CE held in the Demoiselle Remise case
(advisory opinion by Guionin) of July 25, 1952 that a gunshot wound
caused by a member of the so-called French militia did not constitute
misconduct separate from the mission of this group and thus, in
conformity with the Ganascia jurisprudence, due to the retroactive
invalidation by the August 9, 1944 executive order of acts
establishing special police forces, could not entail government
liability.
The Ganascia case law stands for the principle that the retroactive
invalidity of the special legislation enacted by the so-called French
State, by means of the executive order of August 9, 1944, signifies
that the effects of such legislation are not considered not to have
occurred but rather may not be imputable to the current government.
We believe that such an analysis has as its only judicial basis the
provision in the second sentence of Article 1 of the executive order
according to which ―in law, (the Republic) has not ceased to exist.‖
Such a provision, once it is endowed with normative value, signifies
that the government of the so-called French State, inasmuch as it
enacted and implemented special legislation, was not acting as a
continuity of the French government but was merely a de facto
authority as defined by Article 7 of the same executive order. In the
past, the CE had followed the same reasoning by holding that the
government could not be held liable for acts of insurgency of the
Paris Commune.41 The paradox of the Ganascia jurisprudence is that
39. The reference to a militia is to the milice, a paramilitary organization of
Vichy France known for its Gestapo-like brutality. (VGC).
40. See supra note 11.
41. The Paris Commune was a brief government that arose in 1871 from an
insurrection after France‘s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. See generally
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this reasoning has been applied only to the special legislation of the
so-called French State, since the government has been held liable for
all other legislative or regulatory acts passed by the said government,
retroactively validated by the August 9, 1944 executive order,
pursuant to common law. As Raymond Odent observed in his work,
Cours de contentieux administratifs, we are thus dealing with a
fiction. We must emphasize, however, that this fiction is at the source
of Free France, of which President Cassin, drafter of the August 9,
1944 executive order and presiding judge in the Ganascia case, was
the premier lawyer. In this regard, General de Gaulle remarked, in his
War Memoirs, that René Cassin ―all by himself a Conseil d‘Etat,
drafted, seated on a bench in Hyde Park for lack of an office, a
memorandum of irrefutable and incontestable reasoning on the legal
nonexistence of the French state and the Vichy government. The
General would create, on November 16 1940, the legal foundation of
Free France.‖42
In any case, this legal fiction constituted the state of positive law
for more than half a century. Consequently, we believe that, in this
case, although Messrs. Lipietz and S. cannot be deemed to have been
unaware of the existence of their claim against ―the de facto
government which called itself the French State‖ when the August 9,
1944 executive order entered into force, they were, by contrast,
legitimately unaware of any claim they had against the post-war
French government. Therefore, and contrary to the approach adopted
by the Nice TA in the Louis Rouge case on the application of another
special legislation by the so-called French State, it is our view that,
under the above-analyzed provisions of Article 10 of the January 29,
1831 law, the four-year claim extinction period did not begin to run
in the present litigation from the month of August 1944 and that the
four-year statutory period did not begin on January 1, 1969, the date
of the entry into force of the December 31, 1968 law. It follows from
this, without needing to rule on the standing of the Haute-Garonne
administrator to invoke the earlier four-year claim extinction period,
that said administrator in any event does not seem to us to have a
legal basis for invoking the provisions of the law of January 29, 1831.

PROSPER-OLIVIER LISSAGARAY, HISTORY OF THE PARIS COMMUNE OF 1871
(Eleanor Marx trans., 1976). (VGC).
42. René Cassin also wrote a passionate booklet on this subject. See RENE
CASSIN, UN COUP D‘ETAT. LA SOI-DISANT CONSTITUTION DE VICHY (1940).
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In our opinion, the provision of the August 9, 1944 executive
order, according to which ―in law, (the Republic) has not ceased to
exist‖ has been denied normative value only recently. The speech
given by the President of the Republic on July 16, 1995 during the
ceremonies commemorating the great round-up of July 16 and 17,
1942,43 which declared that ―France‖—and no longer merely the de
facto authority calling itself the government of the French State—‖on
that day, committed an irreparable act‖ and that it was now time to
―recognize . . . the errors committed by the government,‖ that these
words could be considered an invitation to allow positive law to
evolve.
Although the August 9, 1944 executive order had not been
amended by the legislature, the CE implicitly—through its en banc
judgment in Pelletier of April 6, 2001 (advisory opinion by Stéphane
Austry), cited earlier—and then explicitly through its en banc
judgment in Papon of April 12, 2002 (advisory opinion by Boissard),
also cited earlier, has since denied normative value to the aboveanalyzed provisions of Article 1 of the August 9, 1944 executive
order. In the Pelletier case, the CE indicated that the July 13, 2000
executive decree establishing reparations measures for orphans
whose parents had been victims of anti-Semitic persecutions, which
the claimants challenged, ―did not (change) the conditions under
which individuals who believed themselves entitled could begin
liability actions against the government.‖ In the Papon case, the CE
specified that the provisions of Article 3 of the August 9, 1944
executive order ―could not have the effect of creating a regime of
lack of liability of the government for the acts committed by the
French administration in the implementation of (the anti-Semitic
legislation of the government of the so-called French State).‖
Stéphane Austry‘s advisory opinion in the Pelletier case analyzed the
provisions of the executive order in the same manner.
Consequently, we believe that, in the case at hand, Messrs. Lipietz
and S. could not be legitimately considered to have been aware of the
existence of their claim against the government within the meaning of
the above-analyzed provisions of Article 3 of the December 31, 1968
law before the Pelletier judgment was rendered on April 6, 2001,
such that the four-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until
43. The reference here is to the round-up of Jews known as the rafle du Vel
d’Hiv, discussed in Rouquette, supra note 3, at 305 n.2.
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the publication date of that case. We thus deem that, at the time the
prior letter of request had been submitted by the plaintiffs on
September 6, 2001 to the administrator of the Haute-Garonne, their
noncontractual liability claim against the government had not
violated the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations defense
invoked by the Haute-Garonne administrator therefore should fail.
*
Concerning the plaintiffs‘ claim against the SNCF, the first Civil
Chamber of the Court of Cassation held in the Dow Chemical France
case on October 27, 1982 that the ten-year statute of limitations does
not run, in the case of a noncontractual liability claim, until the day
on which the claimant ―could truly act,‖ that is to say, possessed
sufficient information regarding the existence of his claim.
In this case, it is clear that Messrs. Lipietz and S. were never
unaware that they had been transported by the SNCF from the HauteGaronne to Paris-Austerlitz, from the morning of May 10, 1944 to the
evening of May 11, 1944. However, the plaintiffs argue that they did
not learn until recently, thanks specifically to the aforementioned
report prepared by researcher Christian Bachelier and published in
September 1996, that the railway transport of individuals who had
been interned on racial grounds for future deportation had not been
organized by the German Occupation authorities with requisitioned
material but rather by the SNCF itself, based on orders placed by the
administrative services of the government of the so-called French
State, each transport being included in the accounts and billed by the
railway industry to the Ministry of the Interior.
Confronted by these facts, the SNCF has relied merely on the
Schaechter case of June 8, 2004, also cited earlier, in which the Paris
Court of Appeals held in a similar case for which it deemed itself to
have jurisdiction that information sufficient for filing an action for
noncontractual liability against the rail industry had been made public
well before the Bachelier report, by several works which it cited and
had been published between 1946 and 1968. Nevertheless, neither the
Paris Court of Appeals judgment nor the SNCF itself in its
submissions to this Court have furnished any evidence of the nature
of the information provided by these works with respect to the role
played by the rail industry in the transportation of individuals
interned on racial grounds for the purpose of deporting them.
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Under these circumstances, it appears to us to result from the
investigation phase of this case that sufficient information on the
existence of the plaintiffs‘ claim against the SNCF had not been
made accessible to the plaintiffs until September 1996, the date the
Bachelier report was published. Consequently, at the time that
Messrs. Lipietz and S. filed their initial request against the regional
director of the SNCF Midi-Pyrénées on September 6, 2001, the tenyear statute of limitations provided by Article 2270-1 of the Civil
Code had not yet expired. The SNCF‘s defense that the statute of
limitations had expired therefore should fail.
*
Regarding the liability of the State and the SNCF for their actions
against Messrs. Lipietz and S., the administrative internment measure
taken against the plaintiffs by the administrative services of the
Haute-Garonne, followed by their transfer by the SNCF from the
Haute-Garonne to Paris-Austerlitz under conditions contrary to
human dignity, are acts attributable to different authorities which
were, in addition, not carried out simultaneously. Under these
circumstances, it is appropriate in our view to clearly identify the
liability that may arise from the said acts in order to decide, if it is
justified, that there be separate liability rather than the joint and
several liability of both authorities as requested by the plaintiffs.
Regarding the government, the administrative internment measure
discussed above that was applied against Messrs. Lipietz and S. by
the Haute-Garonne administrative services, based on the above-cited
provisions of Article 1 of the October 4, 1940 law on ―foreign
nationals of the Jewish race,‖ followed by their transfer to the SNCF
for the purposes of their subsequent transport to the Drancy camp and
their ultimate deportation, can only constitute a wrongful act or
omission capable of leading to liability on the part of the government:
see in this regard the CE Papon case of April 12, 2002, analyzed
earlier.
Regarding the SNCF, the rail industry contests its liability on the
grounds that the Armistice Agreement of June 22, 1940 left it with no
autonomy. They also argue that, although the Bachelier report notes
that the orders to transport individuals interned on racial grounds for
further deportation were given not by the German authorities but
rather by the administrative service of the Ministry of the Interior of
the so-called French government, the industry acted in any event on
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orders.
A total lack of effective autonomy on the part of the SNCF from
June 1940 to August 1944 does not, however, seem to us to emerge at
all from the conclusions of the Bachelier report. On the contrary, the
industry attempted to resist the demands of the German authorities,
albeit with varying success, each time it felt that its fundamental
economic interests were at stake, whether this was with respect to the
replacement of restaurant cars from Mitropa with those of the
International Restaurant Car Company or the repair of the railroad
tracks destroyed due to the continuation of the war between Germany
and Great Britain. By contrast, when it came to the transports of
individuals interned on racial grounds for future deportation, the
SNCF succeeded in imposing, on both the Occupation authorities as
well as the government of the so-called French State, an initiative to
label the transports of the internees as ―Hebrew transfers‖ or
―Ministry of the Interior transfers‖ in view of billing those transports
to that ministry. However, the idea of these transfers engendered not
one official protest from the rail industry and not one secret order of
sabotage. The SNCF‘s independence in the implementation of the
transports of internees seems to us to be particularly clear given that:
first, these transfers—although conducted in primitively built cattle
cars—were being billed to the Ministry of the Interior of the
government of the so-called French State at the rate of a third-class
ticket for a seat per person, and secondly—given the discrepancy in
these invoices—those related to the transfer of individuals interned
on racial grounds from the Haute-Garonne during 1944 were drawn
up by the rail industry after the restoration of republican legality and
addressed to the post-war Ministry of the Interior of the French
Republican provisional government. Finally, it is worth underscoring
that the SNCF has never implied that it had been subjected to any
coercion by the Occupation authorities or by the Ministry of the
Interior of the government of the so-called French State that would
have forced the SNCF to transport the individuals detained in the
inhumane conditions described above.
In light of the totality of these factors, the transport by the SNCF of
Messrs. Lipietz and S. from the Haute-Garonne to Paris-Austerlitz for
further transfer to the Drancy camp and ultimately deportation, under
the conditions described above, represents in our view misconduct
and as such renders the SNCF liable.
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*
This Court would make a fair assessment of the emotional harm
and the troubling living conditions that Messrs. Lipietz and S. were
subjected to by setting the amount of compensation to be allocated at
€ 15,000 per victim.
In our view, there is no reason—contrary to the contention of the
administrator of the Haute-Garonne—to deduct from the amount of
compensation those payments made to the plaintiffs in 1964 under
the Ministerial Order of August 14, 1962 that implemented executive
decree 61-945 of August 24, 1961 (promulgating the July 15, 1960
agreement between France and Germany regarding compensation for
French nationals who had been the subject of National-Socialist
persecution measures). This is because the damages suffered by
Messrs. Lipietz and S. were not imputable to the German Occupation
authorities.
Under these circumstances, the compensation should be set at: €
37,500 for Mr. Guidéon S., € 15,000 for himself, € 15,000 for his
father Mr. Jacques S., and € 7,500 for the claim of his mother Mrs.
Stéphanie S.; and € 22,500 for all of the successors in interest of Mr.
Georges Lipietz: specifically, € 15,000 for Mr. Georges Lipietz
himself and € 7,500 for the mother of Mr. Georges Lipietz, Mrs.
Stéphanie S.
Given the gravity of the misconduct committed by the
administrative services of the Haute-Garonne and the SNCF
respectively, we conclude that two-thirds of the aforementioned sums
should be borne by the government and one-third should be borne by
the SNCF.
The amounts due shall bear interest at the legal rate beginning
from the day the Haute-Garonne administrator and the SNCF
received the request for reparations dated September 6, 2001,
addressed to both parties, the said amounts having been funded on
September 14, 2002, the date on which the plaintiffs presented their
request for funding, as well as at each annual renewal following this
date.
Finally, given the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to
order the government and the SNCF to each pay to the plaintiffs the
sum of € 500 according to the provisions of Article L.761-1 of the
CJA.
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For these reasons, we conclude that:
The government must pay Mr. Guidéon S. and the successors in
interest of Mr. Georges LIPIETZ the respective sums of € 25,000 and
€ 15,000, including interest commencing on the day when the
administrator of Haute-Garonne received the letter of September 6,
2001 in which the government was requested to grant compensation,
with accumulated interest as of September 14, 2002 as on each
annual maturity date, with capitalization at each of these dates to
continue to yield interest; the SNCF must pay Mr. Guidéon S. and the
successors in interest of Mr. Georges LIPIETZ the respective sums of
€ 12,500 and € 7,500, including interest commencing on the day
when the SNCF received the letter of September 6, 2001 in which it
was requested to grant compensation, with accumulated interest as of
September 14, 2002 as on each annual maturity date, with
capitalization at each of these dates to continue to yield interest; the
State and the SNCF each pay a lump sum of € 500 to Mr. Guidéon S.
and to the successors in interest of Mr. Georges Lipietz, pursuant to
Article L.761-1 of the CJA; and the other claims of the complaint be
dismissed.

Translated by Juliana Galan and Alisha L. Jacobsen,
as revised by Vivian Grosswald Curran. All footnotes not
designated as “Translator’s note” were supplied
by Vivian Grosswald Curran.

